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Abstract
SMS information campaigns are increasingly used for policy. To investigate their effec-
tiveness, we conduct a field experiment to study information sharing through mobile phone
messages. Subjects are rural households in Mozambique who have access to mobile money. In
the baseline intervention, subjects receive an SMS containing information on how to redeem
a voucher for a mobile money cash transfer. They can share this information with other
exogeneously assigned subjects. We find that few participants redeem the voucher. They
nonetheless share it with others and many share information they do not use themselves.
Information is shared more when communication is anonymous and we find no evidence of
homophily in information sharing. We introduce treatments to vary the cost of sending a
message, shame those who do not send the voucher to others, or allow subjects to appro-
priate the value of information. All treatments decrease information sharing. To encourage
information sharing, the best is to keep it simple.
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Many policy interventions rely on messages to convey information to a target audience so
as to induce behavioral changes — — e.g., letters (e.g., Hjort et al. 2019 ), SMS (e.g., Alsan
et al. 2020, Afzal et al, 2020, J-Pal 2020 ), mobile phones (e.g., Cole and Fernando 2020,
Kelley et al. 2020 ), and social media (e.g., Alatas et al. 2019 ). The use of messages has only
increased since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In many interventions, the policy maker
has individual identifiers (e.g., phone numbers) for only a small fraction of those he/she wishes
to target. Consequently, reaching other interested individuals through information diffusion in
social networks is essential for the policy to succeed. Yet we know little about how to motivate
people to share information with others. This paper seeks to address this knowledge gap.
The sharing of valuable information is at the heart of many important economic processes,
such as: the diffusion of new technology (e.g., Ryan and Gross 1943 ; Griliches 1957 ; Foster and
Rosenzweig 1995 ; Bandiera and Rasul 2006 ; Beaman et al. 2015 ; Carter et al. 2016; Vilela
2019; Cole and Fernando 2020 ); the adoption of new consumer products (e.g., Fafchamps et
al. 2017 ); credit reference services (e.g., Kandori 1992 ; Greif 1993 ); information about market
opportunities (e.g., Granovetter 1974 ; Fafchamps and Minten 2012; Kelly et al. 2020 ); and
the referral of workers and trainees (e.g., Beaman and Magruder 2012 ; Fafchamps et al. 2020 ).
Information sharing is also essential to social learning, i.e., the process by which crowds form
inference by aggregating dispersed information (e.g., Golub and Jackson 2010 ).
Two key assumptions are central to much of this work. First, people may be unwilling to
share information when doing so brings no immediate or delayed benefit. Indeed, even when
the information itself is non-rival, sharing it typically imposes a cost on the sender. Secondly,
the recipient must put some trust in the information provided even though, in many cases,
the quality of the information cannot be verified, or can only be verified at a cost. These
two phenomena introduce friction: some valuable information is not shared, and some shared
information is not believed.
Epidemiological models of diffusion on networks (e.g., see the excellent reviews by Vega-
Redondo 2007 and Jackson 2010 ) have demonstrated that small changes in the probability that
a message is successfully transferred between two nodes can have dramatic effects on the spread
of information.1 Given this, it is somewhat surprising that little empirical research has sought
to ascertain the extent to which individuals successfully share valuable information with each
other. We know little about whether recipients actually read or believe the messages they receive
and under which conditions they forward these messages to others. The purpose of this paper is
to investigate these research questions formally using an original field experiment implemented
through text messages on mobile phones.
In our baseline intervention, selected volunteers receive an SMS voucher that they can redeem
1For instance, in Poisson random networks with n nodes, a giant component emerges when the link probability
p rises above 1
n
and it grows in size until p reaches log(n)
n
, at which point the network becomes fully connected.
This means that if p represents the probability with which information is successfully transferred between two
arbitrary nodes in a large network, when p < 1
n
only a vanishingly small proportion of nodes will be informed,
while if p > log(n)
n
, all nodes will be informed. It follows that small frictions in information sharing can have large
consequences on information spread and thus on effi ciency.
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for mobile money. The SMS voucher is intended to represent a generic piece of valuable infor-
mation. By offering valuable information on how to receive a monetary transfer, we eschew the
possibility that a piece of information may have a different value for different subjects. Having
received the SMS, subjects can offer the same voucher opportunity to up to four other subjects
who, in turn, can redeem it for cash and pass it on to others. This information transfer process
goes on for several rounds. We focus our attention on whether people redeem the voucher and
whether they pass it on to others. This experimental design mimics the process by which people
share information by passing on or re-posting messages they have received. We use redeeming
behavior to measure the extent to which messages are read and believed. Sending behavior is
used to measure the willingness to share valuable information.
We study a network of individuals (heads of households or their spouses) in rural areas
of Mozambique. This network is purposely formed for the purpose of our study and it links
individuals that were not connected before our study. Importantly, links are randomly selected,
making this network exogenous. This increases the external validity of our findings relative to
information diffusion experiments that rely on — and are thus affected by — the structure of
pre-existing social networks. All communication within the network is done via text messages
that go through the experimenter’s switchboard and the identity of linked individuals is not
revealed. These features severely limit the possibility of unobserved communication outside
the experiment. Since the vouchers that can be shared and redeemed are for mobile money,
familiarity with it is essential. For this reason, we recruit all the participants from a pool of
individuals who were previously introduced to mobile money services, have used the services,
and have active mobile money accounts on their mobile phones.
We find that a surprisingly small proportion of recipients redeem the voucher: 26 percent in
the baseline intervention, and even fewer in most other treatments. This is a surprising result
given that redeeming the voucher is a low cost, high return action. This suggests that many
subjects either ignore the messages they receive, or do not trust them. At the same time, we
find that subjects often share the voucher message with others, even when they do not redeem
it themselves. In other words, some people incur a cost to share information even though not
redeeming the voucher reveals they do not believe it. This type of behavior is more consistent
with a warm glow motivation (e.g., Andreoni 1990 ) than with pure altruism.2 As a result of
limited sharing, information about the redeemable voucher fails to spread.
To investigate factors that can affect the circulation of valuable information among subjects,
we introduce treatments that change the way information is shared. More precisely, we vary
the extent of anonymity in both redeeming and sending decisions; the costs of sending vouchers;
and we introduce alternatives to sending vouchers. We also implement versions of the dictator,
ultimatum, and reverse dictator games adapted to our design. All our testing takes place
in a real-world setting relevant for development policy: that of a widespread communication
platform, i.e., phone-based written communication, and of a recently introduced money transfer
2By definition an altruist cares about the utility of others, not just about the action of giving. An altruist who
believes that paying to redeem the voucher is not beneficial would presumably not want to share it with others.
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technology, i.e., mobile money.
We find that disclosing key characteristics of the sender or recipient reduces information
sharing: both redeeming and sending vouchers fall. The peer characteristics visible to decision-
makers do not impact either redeeming or sending vouchers. These patterns reveal higher
levels of trust when subjects are uninformed about the specific characteristics of the sender or
recipient. We do not observe a significant effect of varying the cost of sending the voucher, but
information sharing falls once any explicit monetary cost is introduced. We obtain no evidence
that the possibility of shaming increases information sharing. In one treatment, we introduce
the ability to circulate erroneous information. We see modest take-up, suggesting that most
subjects do not purposefully set out to harm others by sending false information. We also find
no evidence that allowing senders to extract or solicit payment increases information circulation.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First it complements a theoretical
literature on diffusion that takes information transfer in human populations as a given (e.g.,
Blochet al. 2008 ; Jackson et a. 2012 ). Our results cast some doubts on the implementability of
strategic mechanisms that rely on the near perfect sharing of non-rival information. Second, our
work generalizes earlier findings by Mobius, Phan, and Szeidl (2015) who examine how people
share and aggregate information that helps them win movie tickets. Like us, they find that
diffusion is highly imperfect: signals travel only up to two network steps. It is however unclear
how general their findings are, due to the strategic complexity of their design and the fact that
information is partially rival. Our results confirm that information diffusion is far from perfect
even in the absence of such considerations.
Our findings have far-reaching policy implications. Mobile telephony has revolutionized the
way many activities are conducted. This is particularly true in parts of the developing world
— such as sub-Saharan Africa — where the penetration of mobile phones massively increased
in recent decades. A growing number of policy interventions employ mobile phone messages to
pursue a development objective. Some of these messages nudge recipients into taking a particular
action —e.g., reminders regarding savings (e.f., Karlan et al 2016 ; Blumenstock et. 2016 ; Abebe
et al. 2016 ); debt repayment (Karlan et al. 2012 ; Afzal et al. 2018 ); or preventive health
(Obermayer et al. 2004 ; Patrick et al. 2009 ; Raifman et al. 2014 ). Other interventions have
taken the form of information and awareness campaigns. Recent examples include information
about: agricultural prices (Fafchamps and Minten 2016 ); water quality (Okyere et al. 2017 );
and the electoral process (Aker et al. 2017 ).3
Such interventions have the potential of reaching beyond the recipient of the original message.
Many policy interventions have long sought to increase their impact by relying on diffusion
among peers. A number of recent studies have tested whether such interventions diffuse along
social networks (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2013, 2016 ; Fafchamps and Vicente 2013 ; Comola and
Prina 2017 ; Fafchamps et al. 2020 ). IT can potentially make diffusion among peers much
easier because messages (e.g., SMS, email, tweet, Facebook post) can easily be re-posted or
3Mobile phones have also been used to conduct surveys (e.g., Garlick, Orkin, and Quinn, 2016 ).
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forwarded to others. Its potential is further strengthened by the introduction of mobile money,
as illustrated in our experiment. While most development actors recognize the potential for
running inexpensive nudging or information campaigns through IT, we know little about whether
recipients actually read or believe the messages they receive, and whether they forward these
messages to others. Our paper fills this knowledge gap while, in addition, showing that various
methods for incentivizing the spread of non-rival information tend to backfire: more diffusion is
obtained by keeping things simple.
1. Baseline intervention
The purpose of our experimental design is to test two main assertions: whether people believe
truthful and valuable information received from a stranger; and whether people are willing to
share information that is potentially valuable to strangers. The intervention to which subjects
are exposed —i.e., receiving valuable information by SMS that can be shared with others — is
similar to many policy interventions in developing countries.
Like in Centola (2010), we construct exogenous social networks by randomly assigning sub-
jects to a set of strangers with whom they can share valuable information. They cannot share
it with anybody else. This design feature is shared by a number of recent RCTs that randomly
assign people into groups (e.g., Fafchamps and Quinn 2017, Cai and Szeidl 2018 ). It serves to
eliminate possible confounding effects due to differences in self-selected social networks across
individuals (e.g., Berg et al. 2019, Bandiera et al. 2020 ). This increases the external validity of
our findings relative to interventions that rely on pre-existing social links. Besides, information
shared on IT or social media can be reposted and, as such, has a vocation to be shared with
strangers. In addition, we vary the amount of information that people have about recipients and
senders. We hypothesize that people may be more willing to share valuable information with
people with whom they can identify —if only because they emphasize with them more.
In the remainder of this section we present the experimental design in detail. We first describe
the network structure used throughout the experiment. We then discuss the baseline intervention
and the anonymity treatment and present the main empirical results of this intervention.
1.1. Network
For the purpose of this study we construct a simple network of 192 individuals who had access
to — and had used —mobile money in the 12 months prior to the experiment. This network
is composed of 12 groups (with 16 individuals each), which we call squares. Note that, in our
design, we make sure that individuals in the same square are initially unrelated to each other,
and that individuals in different squares are not connected in the network we construct. This is
to minimize the likelihood of communication outside the control of the experiment.
As illustrated in Figure 1, a square is a 4 × 4 grid of 16 subjects Irp, where r denotes the
round and p denotes the position in the round. We build information sharing links between rows
of the same square as follows: each element in row 1, i.e., subjects I11 to I14, is connected with
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each and every element of row 2, I21 to I24; each element in row 2 is also connected with each
and every element of row 3, I31 to I34; and each element in row 3 is connected with each and
every element of row 4, I41 to I44.
All contacts between participants take place through text messages mediated by the exper-
imenter, i.e., subjects pass information to each other by using text messages relayed by our
switchboard from one subject to another. Subjects are never told the identity or phone number
of the person with whom they are sharing information. All the messages received by participants
come from the switchboard and are written in Portuguese —see Appendix Tables A1 to A8 for
the full list of original messages used in the experiment, together with their English translation.
For each message sent, an experimental subject incurs at most a cost of 1-2 Meticais charged
by the phone operator.4 In compensation for this —and their participation time —each subject
receives a participation fee of 70 Meticais paid in mobile money at the end of the experiment.
When the experiment took place, 1 USD was approximately equivalent to 35 Meticais.
All interventions and treatments are implemented at the level of the square and are divided
into experimental sessions. Each round of a session takes approximately 24 hours, i.e., subjects
in a round have 24 hours to redeem the voucher and to share it with up to four others. This basic
structure applies to each session, with some differences across treatments as described below.
We now describe with more detail the baseline intervention at the level of a square.
1.2. Baseline intervention
The baseline intervention (T0) starts with a seeding round, i.e., round 1. In this round, after
an introductory message by the experimenter, each individual in the first row of the square —
i.e., I11 to I14 —receives an SMS from the experimenter asking whether they want to receive 35
Meticais —approximately 1 USD —on their mobile money account. To receive the money, the
subject has to send a message back with the word ‘yes’.
Each round 1 subject then receives messages asking if he/she wants us to give the same
voucher to round 2 participants. Subjects receive four such messages, one for each of the four
round 2 participants. To instruct us to send the voucher to this other person, the subject has
to reply to each initial SMS with another SMS message containing the word ‘yes’. Since each of
the four senders in round 1 can send the voucher to each of the receivers in round 2, subjects
in round 2 can receive up to four vouchers. Those who do not receive any SMS voucher from
round 1 participants are dropped from the session.
The remaining round 2 participants first receive an introductory message from the experi-
menter before receiving the SMS voucher itself. In round 2 the SMS voucher is worded slightly
differently: it explicitly states that the voucher is sent at the request of another participant in
the experiment. Since there are four round 1 subjects who could have sent the voucher, a round
2 subject can receive up to four times 35 Meticais. To receive the money, the subject has to
4Virtually all subjects in our experiment use pay-as-you-go. Phone operators run occasional promotions of the
form ‘Earn X free SMS if you top up your account by Y Meticais’.
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reply to each of these messages with the word ‘yes’. After this, round 2 subjects receive messages
asking if they want us to give the same voucher to round 3 participants. As in round 1, they
receive four such messages, one for each round 3 participant. Round 2 participants have to reply
‘yes’by SMS to each of those messages if they wish to send the voucher to the corresponding
round 3 participant. Based on these responses, a list is drawn of those round 3 subjects who are
to receive the SMS voucher. Round 3 follows the same structure as round 2. Round 4 starts in
the same way: subjects I41 to I44 receive the SMS voucher for each of the round 3 subjects who
has instructed us to do so. But since this is the last round, they are not asked about sending
the voucher to other players.
Each reply to the experimenter, i.e., both on willingness to receive the voucher and to share
it, has to be answered within 24 hours to be admissible. Messages received after this deadline
are ignored.5 This deadline ensures that each square follows a similar sequencing —similar to
what happens in a lab experiment. Using four separate phone numbers —one for each of the
four receiving and four sending decisions —makes it possible for the experimenter to identify the
sender and intended recipient of each of the messages received on our switchboard. Payoffs are
paid on the mobile money account of each subject at the end of the session.
There are two variants of this baseline intervention: anonymous (A) and informed (I). In the
anonymous variant, no information is provided to either sender or receiver: all the sender knows
is that another participant of the study will receive a SMS voucher similar to the one (s)he
received; similarly, all that the receiver knows is that another study participant has instructed
the experimenter to send him/her a SMS voucher.
In the informed variant, the sender is told about some characteristics of the receiver —namely
gender, age, schooling, and income category. The receiver is given analogous information about
the sender. Information on gender is implicitly conveyed through the first name of the sender or
receiver (which is spelt out in the message); age is given in years; education is given in years of
completed schooling (up to 12th grade) or as type of post-secondary education (e.g., bachelors
or masters); and income is given as one of seven possible categories of monthly income. In
contrast, in the anonymous variant, individuals in the following round are referred as ‘Person p’
with p = 1, ..., 4.
1.3. Sampling and implementation
We implemented the design as a field experiment in Mozambique from May to July, 2015.
Participants were recruited among heads of households or their spouses who took part in an
RCT on the introduction of mobile money in rural Mozambique —a study that took place from
June to August, 2012 and is described in Batista and Vicente (2013, 2018).
The sample for our field experiment is drawn from a representative sample of rural enu-
meration areas with mobile phone coverage in the Mozambican provinces of Northern Maputo
5Very few attempts were made to redeem after the 24 hours window expires. At the time of the study, it was
extremely unlikely to lose phone service for more than an hour in Mozambique.
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Province, Gaza, and Inhambane. Within each of the 102 enumeration areas sampled for that
study, an average of 19 households per enumeration area was selected through a random walk
process — i.e., by walking from the center of the enumeration area in different directions and
inviting each n-th house along the way to participate in the study. The original sample was
selected in 2012 and was followed as a panel until 2015, with several survey rounds (the last
of which in mid-2014). In half of the sample, i.e., in 51 randomly chosen enumeration areas,
mobile money was introduced through the recruitment of a local agent and the organization of
various dissemination activities at the enumeration area level. Within these locations, a random
sub-sample was targeted for individual dissemination of mobile money. By design, participants
to the experiment are more knowledgeable than the average Mozambican about mobile phone
communication and mobile money services.
In this paper we focus on individually treated households from the original sample. This en-
sures that all participants had previously been introduced to mobile money, had used the service,
and had an active mobile money account on their mobile phone at the time of the experiment.6
Most of the 192 individuals in our study were recruited by phone or SMS message. Some were
recruited through face-to-face contact. Informed consent was obtained at the time of recruit-
ment. Subjects were then reminded of the experiment by an SMS message just before starting
the base. Note that the mobile phone operator sends marketing SMS’s to individual subscribers
on a regular basis. While this increases the possibility that our messages are misconstrued as
spam, it also raises the external validity of our findings, since any information campaign using
SMS services in Africa is bound to face the same problem.
The split of the 192 participants into 12 squares follows a random procedure that ensures
that no two subjects from the same enumeration area are allocated to the same square. This is
done to avoid the possibility of direct communication between subjects. The last survey round
held in mid-2014 is the source of the information on individual characteristics that is used in
the non-anonymous variant of the baseline intervention. Funding for this research was provided
by the International Growth Center. The experiment was implemented in collaboration with
Carteira Móvel/Mkesh and the NOVAFRICA offi ce in Mozambique. All SMS messages were
sent and relayed by research assistants recruited for the project.
Key characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 1. Approximately 59 percent of
participants are female, and the average participant is 40 years old. Non-college educated
participants constitute 96 percent of our sample and have 6 years of education on average.
Average monthly income is 3,445 Meticais, which is approximately equal to 98 USD per month.
Table 1 also presents balance tests across experimental treatments. It begins by compar-
ing each pair of squares in terms of demographic characteristics. Across the 330 differences we
tested (66 pairwise tests times 5 variables) we find a total of 19 that are statistically significant
at the 10 percent level —well below what would be expected to occur by chance (10 percent).
6Batista and Vicente (2020) show that mobile money adoption and usage over time among treated individuals
in this sample does not depend on age, gender or expenditure. Mobile money users are, however, likely to be
better educated than non-users within this sample of treated individuals.
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We additionally test for the joint significance of square dummies to check for systematic differ-
ences between squares, and we compare subjects in non-anonymous and anonymous treatment
squares. All these tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no difference for each of the observ-
able characteristics considered. Randomization thus appears to have achieved balance on key
individual characteristics across squares.
We present in Appendix Table B power calculations for the all the main tests presented in
the empirical analysis. Although we do not reach the maximum achievable power allowed by
our design due to the fact that not all subjects in later rounds receive a voucher, we nonetheless
have suffi cient power to detect effects of the magnitude uncovered by our analysis.
1.4. Experimental results in the baseline intervention
Figure 2 reports the average behavior of the experimental subjects in the baseline intervention.
We find that the probability of a participant redeeming the voucher is 26 percent, while the
probability of sending the voucher to any of the four subjects in the next row is 24 percent.
Note that the number of redeeming observations is lower than the total sample size of 192
because many subjects in late rounds never receive any voucher. This happens even though
several (up to four) vouchers could be potentially redeemed by each subject in rounds 2-4. The
number of sending observations is higher than the number of redeeming observations because
each subject who receives a voucher in rounds 1-3 is automatically given the option to send it
to four other subjects, while these subjects can only redeem one voucher.
We interpret the 26 percent probability of redeeming vouchers as evidence that a large
proportion of participants do not accept what is essentially a ‘free lunch’: by replying to the
SMS voucher offer with a ‘yes’SMS message at a cost of 1-2 Meticais, they would have received
35 Meticais. Given that subjects are selected because of their familiarity with mobile phones
and active usage of mobile money, this cannot be due to lack of familiarity. Furthermore, the
research team secured explicit agreement from each individual subject to participate in the
experiment, and reminded each participant individually, shortly before the baseline intervention
was implemented, that messages would follow containing opportunities to earn money. From
this we conclude that not redeeming the voucher suggests a lack of trust or interest in SMS
messages.
In contrast, the propensity to share vouchers appears relatively high, given the cost of sending
messages and the absence of a material benefit for the sender. One possible interpretation is that
sending follows a ‘warm glow’motivation: subjects seem keen to share with others a valuable
opportunity, even if they themselves do not value it highly. Some evidence to this effect comes
from observing that, among the players given the opportunity to both redeem and send vouchers,
11 percent send at least one voucher but do not redeem themselves. Together they represent 33
percent of the subjects who send any voucher.
Turning to the difference between the non-anonymous and anonymous versions of the baseline
intervention, we find that, contrary to our hypothesis, there is more redeeming and sending in
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the anonymous variant. Although this differences is not statistically significant in the baseline
intervention taken in isolation, it becomes significant when we include observations from the
other treatments introduced below. This point is revisited in detail below.
2. Exploring the reasons for low redeeming and sharing
The results from the baseline intervention show that most subjects do not take the mobile
money vouchers seriously enough to redeem them, even though they share these vouchers with
others. In addition, information sharing is reduced when subjects receive information on the
characteristics of voucher senders and recipients. As a result, information diffusion fails to
spread. These findings demonstrate that simply allowing the transmission of valuable but non-
rival information is insuffi cient to trigger an information cascade in our setting.
For this reason, we introduce a series of treatments intended to vary credibility and the cost
of information sharing. These treatments are introduced to our subjects as additional sessions
of the experiment. We first present the experimental design and sequencing of these treatments,
before discussing our testing strategy and examining our empirical results.
2.1. Experimental design and sequencing of treatments 1/2/3
Experimental subjects were invited to three additional sessions after the baseline intervention.
Each of these sessions share many common features with the baseline intervention, but we vary
the cost of or not sending SMS vouchers. In one treatment, we also allow subjects to share infor-
mation they know to be untrue. By varying these experimental parameters, we hope to throw
light on the role of cost and lack of credibility in the imperfect message transmission observed in
the baseline intervention. If information sharing is hindered by cost considerations, we expect a
dramatic drop in information circulation once we increase the cost of sharing vouchers. Further-
more, if information sharing is motivated primarily by altruism, we do not expect the sharing
of untrue messages. But if senders have invidious or rival preferences —or are mischievous —we
expect to observe some circulation of erroneous messages.
We now describe the design of each of the three treatments. As in the baseline intervention,
each of them is played in four rounds within a square with 16 subjects as depicted in Figure 1.
Treatment T1 (the “variable sending cost” treatment) introduces an additional cost of sending
the voucher to another subject. This cost takes four possible values: 0 (as in the baseline
intervention); 5; 10; or 15 Meticais per shared message. It is paid on top of the 1-2 Meticais that
is charged per SMS by the phone provider. Each subject faces each of the four different cost
levels in a randomized order, in each of the subsequent rounds. Incurred costs are deducted from
the payoff sent to the subject’s mobile money accounts at the end of the session. In all other
respects, this treatment is the same as the baseline intervention. Varying the cost of sending
the voucher allows us to infer subjects’willingness to pay for sending valuable information to
others.
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Treatment T2 (the “fixed sending cost and shaming” treatment) presents subjects with a
different default option when sending vouchers to others. In the baseline intervention and in
treatment T1, if the subject does not respond to the initial SMS sent by the experimenter, no
action is taken —i.e., no voucher or message is sent to the potential recipient. In contrast, in
treatment T2 the default is that, in the event that the subject takes no action (i.e., responds
‘no’or does not reply), the experimenter sends a message to the recipient revealing that the
sender was given an opportunity to pass the voucher but failed to do so —as a consequence of
which the recipient is unable to win 35 Meticais. In this treatment, the cost of sending is set to
5 Meticais —in addition to the phone operator’s cost per SMS. The rest of the design is the same
as in the baseline intervention. The purpose of this treatment is to increase the psychological
cost of not sending the voucher to others. To put it more bluntly, it shames the sender for failing
to send the voucher. As a result we expect it to increase sharing. To the extent that shame is
related to social image within a group sharing a similar identity, we expect this treatment to
be particularly effective in the non-anonymous variant when experimental subjects know each
other’s characteristics.
Treatment 3 (the “fixed sending cost and erroneous code message”treatment) adds a second
default option to treatment T2 when subjects are asked about the sending of vouchers. In the
same way as in treatments T0 and T1, if the sender does not reply ‘yes’to the offer to share the
voucher, no further action is taken by the experimenter. Similar to treatment T2, if the sender
responds ‘yes’to the initial message sent by the system, the SMS voucher is sent to the recipient
and a fixed price of 5 Meticais is deducted from the sender’s payoff. If the sender responds ‘no’,
the receiver gets an SMS containing an erroneous code that cannot be redeemed for money.7
The remainder of the design is as in the baseline intervention. The purpose of this treatment is
to disentangle an explicit decision not to share —e.g., motivated by rival or invidious preferences
—from simple inaction. In treatment T2, these two motives are confounded. In treatment T3,
if the sender sends an incorrect voucher to the recipient by responding ‘no’(at the small cost of
sending an SMS), this clearly manifests a desire not to share with the recipient —as opposed to
inattention or inaction.
In the experiment, half of the squares — i.e., group of 16 subjects — plays the baseline
intervention first, and then treatments T1, T2 and T3 in random order. This allows us to achieve
identification within subjects. There are six squares playing treatments T0/1/2/3. They are
divided in two sets of three squares: one set always play the anonymous variant; the other always
plays the variant where the characteristics of senders and recipients (gender, age, education and
income range) are provided. Within each of these groups of three squares, the order of treatments
T1/2/3 is varied systematically. The resulting assignment structure of squares is as depicted in
Figure 3, where Gi stands for treatment number i and A/I stands for Anonymous/Informed.




We split our analysis between the decision to receive mobile money from others, and the decision
to send mobile money to others. In each case, we test for differences across treatments, whether
sender and receiver are fully anonymous, and whether sending and receiving vary systematically
with subject characteristics.
In addition to reporting average choices for each treatment, we report results from a regres-
sion analysis. For receiving or redeeming vouchers, we use the following core specification:






ijrt + γIi + δr + εijrt (2.1)
where the dependent variable Rijrt is a binary variable taking value 1 in case subject i redeemed
a voucher opportunity sent by subject j in round r and period t. Regressors are as follows: Gkijrt
is a treatment k dummy variable; Ii is a binary variable equal to 1 in the non-anonymous variant;
and δr is a vector of round and session dummies, included to control for the possibility that
experimental fatigue or loss of attention affects our findings. We also estimate a specification
that adds prior redeeming in earlier sessions to see whether a positive experience with redeeming
in an earlier session spurs more confidence in voucher messages.
To test for homophily we estimate a model that includes absolute differences |Xi − Xj |
in individual characteristics X between subject i and the subject j from whom i received the
voucher.8 We only use the four characteristics Xi that are revealed to i about j —and vice versa.
Since pairwise characteristics are only revealed to subjects in the non-anonymous treatment,
|Xi − Xj | is interacted with the non-anonymous treatment dummy Ii. When estimating this
regression we also include characteristics Xi and absolute differences |Xi − Xj | as additional
controls.9 The estimated regression is thus of the form:







+θ|Xi −Xj |Ii + µXi + λ|Xi −Xj |+ δr + εijrt (2.2)
Homophily implies θ < 0 —i.e., the more dissimilar i and j are, the less i is willing to redeem a
voucher from j.10 When estimating regression (2.2), we only include redeeming decisions that
apply to SMS vouchers received from another subject —i.e., we drop observations from round 1
subjects who receive the voucher from the experimenter.
To examine sending behavior, the baseline specification for treatments T1/2/3 takes the
following form:






ijrt + θCijt + γIi + δr + εijrt (2.3)
8To facilitate interpretation, when Xi is a dichotomous variable — e.g., gender — we replace the absolute
difference with a dummy equal to one if i and j have the same gender, and 0 otherwise.
9For instance, |Xi −Xj | may be systematically larger when Xi is large.
10When the regressor is a dummy equal to 1 if i and j share a characteristic —e.g., gender —the interpretation
is reversed.
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where the dependent variable Sijrt is a dummy equal to 1 in case subject i sends a voucher
opportunity to subject j in round r and period t. Variable Cijt is the cost of sending the
voucher to another subject which, in treatments T0/1/2/3, varies exogenously by subject pair
ij. We also estimate a specification that includes the redeeming decision as additional control,
and a specification that adds |Xi − Xj |, and controls Xi, to test for homophily in sending
decisions. All the econometric specifications are estimated using a linear probability model and
the reported standard errors are clustered at the individual level (i.e., across sessions).
2.3. Empirical results on treatments T1/2/3
2.3.1. Treatment averages
Table 2 reports the average behavior of the subjects in the baseline intervention and in each
of treatment T1/2/3. Similarly to what happened in the baseline intervention, the number of
redeeming observations is less than 192, the number of individuals in the squares, because many
subjects earmarked for later rounds never receive any voucher they could redeem.
Columns (2)-(4) of Table 2 present average redeeming and sending decisions in treatments
T1/2/3. As explained earlier, the order of the treatments varies randomly across squares, i.e.,
they are not necessarily played in the order in which they appear in Table 2 —and hence the
order in which treatments T1/2/3 were played should not drive the results.
We observe a dramatic drop in both redeeming and sending behavior in treatments T1/2/3
relative to the baseline intervention. The voucher redemption rate falls by between 27 (T3) to
49 (T1) percent, even though the cost of redeeming is the same across treatments. Sending
in treatments T1/2/3 falls relative to the baseline intervention by an even larger percentage
(between 41 percent in T1 and 74 percent in T3), possibly because the cost of sending is higher
in these treatments relative to the baseline intervention.
Contrary to expectations, sending is more common in T1 than in T2 and T3, even though
the cost of sending is, on average, highest in T1. The propensity to send is lower in T2 than in
T1 —suggesting that changing the no-reply default action to a shaming message did not create
a psychological pressure to give. This is reminiscent of situations (e.g., DellaVigna, List, and
Malmendier, 2012 ) in which individuals give because they perceive a moral pressure to do so
but feel exonerated if a device (in our case, a default erroneous message) takes an action for
them. In T3 subjects could either pay 5 Meticais to send an SMS voucher to the receiver, send
an erroneous voucher message, or do nothing. In practice, we only observe two cases of a subject
sending an erroneous voucher message, making this treatment similar to T1 with a slightly lower
cost of sending on average. We nonetheless observe a further decrease in the sending probability,
which now falls to 6 percent. One possible explanation is that the introduction of an irrelevant
but selfish alternative prompts subjects to act selfishly. Similarly to the baseline intervention,
anonymous variants of treatments T1/2/3 yield higher redeeming and sending rates than their
non-anonymous variant.
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2.3.2. Redeeming the voucher
To fully assess the determinants of redeeming vouchers in treatments T0/1/2/3, we regress
the redeeming decision as specified in the testing strategy Section. The dependent variable is a
binary variable taking value 1 if the subject sends a ‘yes’SMS in response to a voucher offer, and
0 otherwise. The results are shown in Table 3. Column (1) reports the results from regression
model (2.1).11 In column (2) we add a dummy variable with value 1 if the subject redeemed a
voucher in a previous session: subjects who trust the SMS enough to redeem it in one session
should also be more likely to trust it in a subsequent session. Column (3) reports estimates for
model (2.2) that tests for homophily. In addition to regression coeffi cients, at the bottom of
Table 3 we report test statistics of the null hypothesis that there is no difference between pairs
of treatments.
Regression analysis confirms that the probability of redeeming decreases between the baseline
intervention and the other three treatments although, for T3, this is only significant in column
(2). The reduction in redeeming is large relative to the counterfactual probability of redeeming
in the baseline intervention: the probability of redeeming drops by 18 to 30 percentage points in
T1 and T2 relative to T0, and by 21 percentage points in T3. Pairwise comparisons reported at
the bottom of Table 3 nonetheless indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that redeeming
is equally likely under treatments T1, T2 and T3.
As already observed in Table 2, we find a large reduction in redeeming in the non-anonymous
variant: this difference is about 20 percentage points and is statistically significant in the main
specification (columns 1 and 2). This confirms that subjects are more likely to redeem a voucher
that comes from an anonymous source. We also observe more redeeming in round 1, that is,
when the voucher originates from the experimenter, than when the voucher comes from another
subject. This further confirms that messages are more trusted when they come from a more
anonymous source, which is a priori counter-intuitive. We do not find systematic treatment
order effects.
Since payoffs are deposited on subjects’mobile money account at the end of each session,
subjects who redeem in a given session receive the voucher money at the end of that session.
This should make them more confident of receiving the voucher money in subsequent sessions.
We therefore expect redeeming behavior to be persistent. This is indeed what we find: there
is a strong positive correlation between redeeming now and redeeming in a previous session.
We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that this captures differences in trusting behavior
across subjects.
When adding pairwise regressors (column 3), point estimates suggest that subjects are more
likely to redeem a voucher received from a person of the same gender and education level.
But none of these effects is statistically significant.12 From this we conclude that there is no
11The non-anonymous dummy, for the analysis of redeeming, always takes value 1 (non-anonymous) for round
1 since subjects knows that vouchers originate from the experimenter.
12Similar results (not shown here) are obtained if we estimate an individual fixed effect model that compares
redeeming behavior across different senders for the same receiver. Because the number of subjects who receive
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conclusive evidence of homophily in redeeming decisions. Perhaps this is not too surprising
given that there is on average less trust in the non-anonymous variant. From the estimated
coeffi cients of individual characteristics Xi, we also note that older subjects redeem less and
richer participants redeem more. This could be because individuals who are younger and richer
are more familiar with mobile phones and more willing to risk 1-2 Meticais for the prospect of
receiving 35 Meticais.
2.3.3. Sending the voucher
We report in Table 4 a similar analysis for the decision to send the voucher to another participant
in treatments T0/1/2/3. The dependent variable is a binary variable taking value 1 if the subject
sends an SMS instructing the experimenter to send the mobile money voucher to another subject.
Recall that there are four such decisions per voucher recipient, one for each of four possible
recipients in the following round (i.e., to the next row in Figure 1 ). We control for the cost of
sending the SMS, which varies between 0/5/10/15 Meticais across subject pairs ij in T1. This
cost is set at 5 Meticais in T2 and T3, and 0 Meticais in the baseline intervention.
Column (1) of Table 4 reports coeffi cient estimates for specification (2.3). In column (2) we
add two redeeming dummies —one for the previous session, as in Table 3, and one for the current
session, just before the decisions to send. The purpose of including these control variables is
to test whether subjects are more likely to send a voucher that they themselves redeem —as
would be the case if sharing is done primarily by those who trust the message enough to redeem
it. Column (3) includes |Xi − Xj |Ii and related controls as additional regressors to test for
homophily in sending choices.
As already noted when discussing Table 2, we observe a strong reduction in sending probabil-
ity between the baseline interventions and treatments T1/2/3. These differences are all large in
magnitude and statistically significant, ranging between 9 and 26 percentage points depending
on the specification. Given that sending is costlier in treatments T1/2/3 than in T0, these find-
ings suggest that sharing information is cost sensitive. However, the cost of sending a message,
which varies randomly in T1, has no significant effect on the probability of sending a voucher,
casting some doubt on the hypothesis that cost differences is the only cause for the difference in
sending probability between T0 and treatments T1/2/3.
The results further indicate that sending the voucher is less likely in T2 and T3 than in
T1. In T2, when the sender chooses not to send the voucher, the recipient receives a message
saying that the sender had the option to send something but did not. This can be interpreted as
shaming the sender (for not sending valuable information) in the hope of increasing information
sharing. This attempt appears to backfire: if anything, this treatment reduces sharing. The
difference between T1 and T2 is not, however, statistically significant as shown at the bottom of
Table 4. But we do find that sending the voucher is significantly less likely in T3 than in T1. To
multiple SMS vouchers is relatively small, however, the number of observations is small and statistical power is
limited.
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recall, treatment T3 is when the sender has the opportunity to alert the recipient that he/she
chose not to share the voucher. While this almost never happens, senders may anticipate that
information is less likely be trusted (even though there is no evidence of this in Table 3 ) and
decide not to incur the cost of sending it. Alternatively, they may find the choices confusing
and, perhaps, objectionable and opt not to participate. In any case, this treatment significantly
reduces information sharing.
In column (2) we see that individuals who have redeemed a voucher in the past or current
session are also significantly more likely to send it. The estimated coeffi cient is largest for those
who redeem in the current session. Since subjects only find out whether the promised transfer
was deposited in their account at the end of the session, this correlation cannot be driven by
having received the voucher. Rather, it suggests either that those who redeem are more attentive
to the experiment, or that those who trust our message are more likely to both redeem and share
it.
We find that sending is less likely in the non-anonymous variant, but this effect is not sta-
tistically significant —unlike what happens with redeeming behavior in Table 3. The magnitude
of the effect is however large: an 8 percentage point reduction in information sharing in column
(1), compared to an anonymous probability of sharing of 30 percent in the baseline T0. This
suggests that participants are more willing to share information in an anonymous setting. Be-
cause redeeming is also lower in the non-anonymous treatment, controlling for past and current
redeeming behavior in column (2) absorbs the effect of the non-anonymous dummy. To investi-
gate the role of anonymity further, we reestimate specification (2.3) with additional regressors to
test for homophily. If the reluctance to share information comes from the sender realizing that
the prospective recipient is different from him/her, the non-anonymous treatment effect should
vanish for subject pairs who have similar characteristics. This is not what we find: differences or
similarities between sender and receiver are never statistically significant although, as in Table
3, point estimates for same gender and same education are large in magnitude. If the reduction
in information sharing is not due to a reluctance to share with dissimilar individuals, then it
might be due to the sender’s reluctance to have his/her characteristics revealed to the recipient
—i.e., the fear of being recognized. This may be particularly problematic if senders are unsure of
the value of the message. In any event, subjects seem more willing to share valuable information
with complete strangers while remaining anonymous themselves.
Finally, we note that sending is more common among younger, better educated, and richer
participants —consistent with these subjects being more familiar with the mobile phone tech-
nology, and being less concerned about the cost of sending a message to benefit others.
3. Incentivizing information transfer
We have established that information transmission by SMS is imperfect, impervious to shame,
and insensitive to variation in transfer cost at the margin. None of the treatments introduced
so far manage to improve information diffusion. We now try a different approach and seek to
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incentivize senders for sharing valuable information. Our objective is to identify a method by
which the broadcaster of a valuable message can seed a social network and then rely on peer-
to-peer transmission to reach a larger audience, without the need to provide direct incentives to
senders. To this effect, we investigate different forms of decentralized peer-to-peer transfers by
which the sender can be rewarded directly by the recipient.
We first present the experimental design and sequencing of these new treatments, before dis-
cussing the testing strategy and the empirical results obtained with these additional treatments.
3.1. Experimental design and sequencing of treatments T4/5/6
It has often been noted that sharing valuable information with others generates a sense of
gratefulness, and triggers a desire for the recipient to reciprocate. To capture these ideas in
a stylized manner, we introduce treatments that allow the sender to impose, solicit, or receive
a payment. We hypothesize that, if these payments are accepted by recipients on the basis of
reciprocity, incentivizing senders should improve the dissemination of valuable information.
To test this hypothesis, we introduce three additional treatments —labelled T4/5/6 —that
allow transfers between the sender and receiver of the voucher. To do this in a structured way
over an anonymous network, we adapt the standard dictator, ultimatum, and reverse dictator
games to our setting. To streamline SMS communication, all three treatments have a default
option that is implemented if the sender does nothing. We examine whether the type of default
option matters. The details are as follows.
Treatment 4 ( the “dictator game with a default option”) adapts a standard dictator game
to our setting. It is intended to mimic interventions in which someone is rewarded for sharing
information with someone else —e.g., by receiving a gift card for sharing the names of potential
buyers with a seller, or by being rewarded for bringing a friend to an STD health screening.
In this treatment, a subject is asked to share a 35 Meticais voucher between themselves
and one subject in the subsequent row of the square. Each row 1 subject does this four times,
once for each subject in row 2. In other words, each subject in row 1 receives 35 Meticais four
times can share this amount with one subject from row 2. These decisions are then combined
to calculate the total payoff of the sender. If the sender does not respond to one of the four
messages, this is treated as equivalent to sending nothing, in which case the sender keeps the 35
Meticais. This is different from a standard dictator game where there is no default option and
the subject is forced to pick a division of the pie. If the subject does not respond to any of the
four messages, he/she receives 35× 4 = 140 Meticais.
The same decision structure is repeated in round 2: the experiment sends 35 Meticais four
times to each round 2 subject, and each time the round 2 subject can share part of it with a round
3 subject. The same is again repeated in round 3. Subjects in row 4 do not decide anything; they
just receive what row 3 subjects choose to send them. As in the baseline intervention, subjects
in rounds 2 to 4 do not receive any message if nothing is sent to them by previous participants.
The idea behind this aspect of the design is again to investigate how far information diffuses in
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the network.
In this treatment, the sender is given the opportunity to appropriate the entire value of each
voucher. The purpose of this is to determine the extent to which subjects are willing to share
something valuable instead of appropriating it. If the subject does nothing, this is treated as
not sharing. Furthermore, if the sender does nothing, the recipient is not informed that the
sender had an opportunity to share. These differences with the standard dictator game are
introduced into our design to capture the fact that, in practice, sharing information requires
a deliberate action — doing nothing is the default — and if someone does not share valuable
information, potential recipients typically do not learn of it. Whether T4 induces more or less
sharing is unclear a priori. The fact that not sharing is financially attractive may reduce sharing,
especially given that it is the default option. But allowing subjects to appropriate part of the
voucher also rewards them for sharing the rest of the voucher, which may encourage sharing.
Treatment 5 (the “ultimatum game with a default option”) adapts an ultimatum game to
our framework. It is similar to treatment T4: each subject in rounds 1 to 3 is asked four times
to share 35 Meticais between themselves and one subject in the next row. The difference is
that, in this treatment, the designated recipient can refuse the share of the 35 Meticais that is
proposed by the sender. If the recipient refuses the sender’s offer, both sender and receiver get
nothing. Each receiver has to make this decision each time he/she receives an offer to share 35
Meticais. If the sender does not make any offer to a particular recipient —i.e., does nothing —
this is treated as a rejection by the sender, and both subjects receive nothing. This introduces
an important difference relative to T4: in order for the recipient to have an opportunity to reject
an offer, an offer has to be made. If the recipient does not agree with an offer —or does nothing
— this is treated as a rejection by the recipient, and both subjects also receive nothing. This
treatment mimics a market for information in which the seller sets a take-it-or-leave-it price: if
the potential buyer refuses the offer, the seller forfeits his profit. This design offers the advantage
that it gives the recipient of the information a veto: if the recipient does not believe/value the
information provided, there is no reason to accept the offer.
Treatment 6 (the “reverse dictator game with a default option”) is similar to T4 except that
it is the recipient who unilaterally decides how much to send back to the sender. Round 1 is
exactly the same as in the baseline intervention: subjects choose whether to redeem the voucher
and whether to send vouchers to each row 2 subjects. Subjects in round 4 only decide how
much to send back. Subjects in rounds 2 and 3 first decide how much to send back to the
sender from the previous row, and then whether to send a voucher to each of the receivers in
the subsequent row. Unlike in the baseline intervention, subjects do not have to respond ‘yes’to
the SMS voucher in order to receive it —they are only asked to determine how much they wish
to send back. If a subject does not respond, he/she is assumed to send back nothing —which
is the mirror image to the sender’s decision in T4: doing nothing is equivalent to appropriating
the whole voucher. As in the baseline intervention, a subject in rows 2 to 4 only participates
if at least one subject from the previous row decided to send him/her a voucher. Importantly,
T6 is not entirely equivalent to a reverse dictator game in the sense that the receiver knows
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that the voucher was sent by the sender. We hypothesize that this distinction may create a
reciprocity effect that mimics the ‘pay-what-you-want’market model as practiced, for instance,
by rock band Radiohead in 2007 for their album "In Rainbows".
Each treatment is played on a square — i.e., group of 16 subjects — as for the baseline
intervention. We have already noted that six of the twelve squares that played the baseline
intervention were randomly assigned to treatments T1, T2 and T3 for the subsequent three
sessions. The other six are similarly assigned to play treatments T4, T5 and T6, in random
order, over three sessions. These six squares are further divided into two groups of three: one
always is assigned to the anonymous variant; the other to the non-anonymous variant. The
assignment structure of treatments to squares is depicted in Figure 3, where Gi stands for
treatment i and A/I stands for Anonymous/Non-anonymous.
Table 1 compares the two halves of our sample, namely those playing treatments T1/2/3
and those playing treatments T4/5/6. Within each of the two halves of the sample, balance
across treatments is achieved by experimental design. All the tests that we performed fail to
reject the null hypothesis of no difference for each of the observable characteristics. From this we




In treatments T4/5/6 the primary emphasis is on sending decisions. Recall that in T4 and T5
senders decide an amount to be sent. In T6 they decide whether to send the voucher or not.
In T4 receivers do nothing. In T5 receivers can either accept or reject the take-it-or-leave-it
offer. In T6 receivers decide whether to redeem a voucher from the experimenter in round 1
and then whether and how much to send back to the sender. We report the average behavior
of the subjects on all these choices in Table 5. Note that some actions are not relevant in some
treatments, e.g., receiving is automatic in T4, and sending back is an action only possible in T6.
In T4 the sender appropriates the full value of the voucher by doing nothing. We see
that introducing this possibility leads to a fall in the propensity to send something to the
receiver: from 24 percent in the baseline intervention to 15 percent in T4. These differences
are statistically significant. They suggest that when senders cannot appropriate the voucher,
they are willing to spend some of their own money to benefit someone else, and when they can
appropriate the voucher, many prefer doing so instead of sharing even a fraction of it. We also
note that, even when they send something, subjects only give 27 percent of the average voucher
value. Across all subjects and decisions, senders retain more than 96 percent of the voucher
value. This suggests that adding the possibility of appropriating the value of the information
crowds out altruistic motives, and that most subjects choose to do nothing when it is to their
material advantage.
In T5, sharing the value of information entails the risk of rejection: the receiver may refuse
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the offer made — something that occurs in 43 percent of the cases. We observe an overall 18
percent probability of sending money to the receiver, lower than in T0 and only slightly higher
than T4. This is a priori surprising because, in T5, the sender appropriates everything if no
offer is made while in T5 the sender receives something only if making an offer. This suggests
that subjects are reluctant to make an offer that can be rejected. We also note that the amount
sent does not increase relative to T4, which may explain why many offers are rejected. This
evidence indicates that introducing squabbling among subjects over how to share the value of
information is detrimental to information diffusion.
In T6, the sender can only elect to send or not the full voucher value to the receiver, as
in the baseline intervention. We find that the probability of sending in T6 is identical to that
in T0. This suggests that the prospect of receiving something back from the receiver does not
incentivize senders to send more. In 12 percent of the cases, the receiver elects to send something
back, i.e., at a rate that is broadly similar to what senders do in T4. But when they do, they
send back a much higher proportion of the voucher value —typically almost all of it, suggesting,
among these subjects, a reciprocity motive. Senders in round 1 are also given the choice to
redeem or not the voucher sent by the experimenter. 38 percent of subjects do so. Finally we
note that, as in Table 2, anonymous variants of the treatments T4 to T6 cause higher sending
rates.
3.2.2. Transfers
We now estimate a model on the decision to transfer any amount, i.e., employing as a dependent
variable a binary variable taking value 1 if the sender sends a positive amount to the recipient,
and 0 otherwise. For the decision to send or send back money in treatments T4/5/6, we estimate
the following specification:






ijrt + γIi + δr + εijrt (3.1)
where the treatment dummy G superscript 6 refers to the decision to send in treatment T6 while
6b refers to the decision to send back in that same treatment. The specification is similar to
(2.3), except that we do not include the cost of sending since it is constant. We also estimate
a specification that adds absolute difference terms |Xi −Xj | and controls Xi, again to test for
homophily. These econometric specifications are estimated using linear probability models and,
as before, reported standard errors are clustered across sessions at the individual level. The
amount sent is examined in a separate regression.
Results for the decision whether to transfer or not are shown in Table 6. Column (1) follows
specification (3.1); column (2) adds pairwise characteristics to test for homophily. Note that
treatment T6 has two sending decisions, one made by the sender and another one made by the
receiver. From Table 5, we already know that sending is on average less frequent in T4 and T5
than in the baseline intervention. The exception is T6 where the likelihood of sending money is
higher. By comparing point estimates for T4 and T6, we see that the difference between them
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is large in magnitude: 15 to 16 percentage points. This makes sense: of the four sending actions
taken in treatments T4/5/6, sharing by the sender in T6 is the one that is most similar to
sending in T0. The fact that propensities to send are similar in both cases indicates that giving
the sender an opportunity to receive something in return does not, by itself, increase willingness
to send. In contrast, in T4, not sending anything lets the sender appropriate the full value of
the voucher. This likely explains the significant difference between the two treatments.
Treatment T5 is similar to T6 regarding senders’ decisions: not sending anything means
forfeiting the voucher. We should thus observe a similar propensity to send in both T5 and T6.
This is however not what we observe: the frequency of sending in T5 is similar to T4 where
the sender appropriates the voucher by not sending anything, and lower than in T6 (sender’s
decision). This suggests that subjects prefer sending the information and letting the recipient
decide whether to send something back, rather than making a take-it-or-leave it offer to the
recipient and risking rejection (43 percent of offers are rejected in T5). It follows that the fear
of rejection seems to serve as a disincentive to share.
We also observe that the probability of sending back in T6 is not statistically different from
sending in T4: sender and receiver are equally likely to appropriate everything. This arises
even though, in T6, the recipient knows that the sender is aware that the recipient could send
something back while, in T4, the potential recipient is not aware that the sender could have sent
anything. This suggests the absence of a reciprocity motive, at least in terms of sending anything
at all as we discuss further below. We also note that in both T4 (sender) and T6 (receiver) the
probability of sending is lower than what is often observed in dictator games. This difference
may be due to the fact that, in both cases, appropriating everything can be achieved by picking
the default option, which is doing nothing. This exonerates subjects from the moral pressure
that is present in a standard dictator or reverse dictator game, where there is no default option.
Column (1) also shows that the likelihood of sending in the anonymous variant is 6 percentage
points higher than in the non-anonymous variant. Turning to column (2), we again find no
statistical evidence to support homophily in sending behavior —even if the point estimate on
same gender is a large 11 percentage points. These results are similar to those we reported in
Table 5. Taken together, this evidence confirms subjects’ reluctance to share information in
the non-anonymous setting. Regarding other coeffi cient estimates (not reported in the Table to
save space), we again find negative round effects —sharing is lower in rounds 3 and 4 —but no
significant differences across sessions —suggesting the absence of subject learning or fatigue in
these treatments. We also find that subjects who are male, young, educated, and poorer are
more likely to send something.
Table 6 focused on the effect of treatment on the extensive margin —the likelihood of sending
something. We complement these results by showing in Table 7 the effect of treatment on the
intensive margin. To this effect, we present a regression of the amount sent (conditional on
sending) as a function of treatment. Given the small number of non-missing observations, we
only include treatment dummies as regressors. The results show that, conditional on giving,
the amount given is far larger for subjects who send something back in T6, suggestive of a
21
reciprocity motive among the 12 percent of subjects who choose to send anything back.
4. Robustness
Before concluding, we investigate the robustness of our findings to the possibility that some
subjects simply ignore all the messages originating from the experiment. This may still arise
in spite of our efforts to the contrary: all the subjects are familiar with the research team,
having participated in an earlier randomized controlled trial by the same researchers; we selected
subjects who were already familiar and actively using text messages and mobile money; and we
secured explicit informed consent from all the subjects shortly before the experiment began.
We start by noting that 31 percent of the subjects assigned to rounds 2-3-4 were never sent
any voucher by subjects in earlier rounds. As a result, they never had the opportunity to redeem
or send vouchers to other subjects. These subjects have already been omitted from the analysis.
Of the remaining participants, 55 percent never actively participated in the experiment either
by accepting a voucher or by sending a message to another subject. Our concern is that some
of these subjects may have failed to participate for reasons beyond their control —e.g., they lost
access to the phone number that was used to contact them. We wish to ensure that our findings
—e.g., low redeeming of vouchers —are not mechanically driven by their non-activity.
To this effect, we repeat the analysis of Tables 3, 4 and 6 using only subjects who responded
to at least one of our messages. We focus on the main specifications of the previous tables, i.e.,
with a full list of controls, and with previous redeeming behavior when considering treatments
T0/1/2/3. We omit the homophily specifications since they are never significant. Results
are shown in Table 8 for treatments T0/1/2/3 and in Table 9 for treatments T4/5/6. Not
surprisingly, estimated treatment effects is larger in magnitude —given that inactive subjects
are omitted. But otherwise the findings are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables
3, 4 and 6. In particular, results regarding the role of anonymity and previous redeeming are
unchanged.
There are some small differences, however. We now find that sending back in T6 is signifi-
cantly more likely than in T4 (see Table 9 ), consistent with reciprocity on the part of receivers
in that treatment. We also find that sending in T2 is significantly lower than in T1 (see Table 8 )
and that high income subjects are less likely to send information to others across all treatments.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we followed a sample of rural Mozambicans with access to mobile money services.
We investigated: (i) their willingness to believe valuable information they receive, and (ii) their
willingness to share this valuable information with others. To this effect, we formed an exogenous
network between subjects and tested a number of experimental settings implemented through
SMS messages containing vouchers redeemable for mobile money. By assigning network links
exogenously, we aim to improve relative to experiments on information diffusion that rely on
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pre-existing social networks that are context-specific.
We find that subjects have a relatively low propensity to redeem the voucher, but a compar-
atively high propensity to send it to others. People thus appear rather skeptical about the value
of the message they receive, but this does not stop them from incurring a small cost to share it
with others. Many subjects indeed share information that they do not use themselves, a behav-
ior that can be interpreted as consistent with a warm glow motive. We nonetheless observe that
both redeeming and sending are higher among subjects who previously redeemed the voucher,
suggesting that they are more likely to share information if they find it trustworthy. Contrary
to expectations, anonymity increases both receiving and sending, and there is no evidence of
homophily in sharing. Why this is the case is unclear. One possibility is that senders are unsure
of the value of the message and may worry others may think poorly of them for passing it on.
In terms of behavioral variation between treatments, we find that the sharing of information
falls when we introduce an explicit cost of sharing —but we do not find that subjects respond
to variation in that cost. We find no evidence that shaming helps information transfer: sharing
falls when we reveal that senders send nothing, and subjects do not like to reveal that they
sent nothing. We also observe less sharing in treatments that allow subjects to appropriate
the value of the shared information —irrespective of the system put in place to allow transfers
between subjects. Allowing information recipients to send anything back to the sender achieves
just the same amount of information diffusion as the baseline intervention without this option.
Taken together, these findings indicate that sharing information is not motivated by the hope
of reciprocation —at least in our setting.
In terms of policy, this research reveals the diffi culty of using mobile phone messages to diffuse
valuable information in a developing country. Even when participants have been sensitized
beforehand and a substantial amount of money is at stake, many individuals fail to make use
of the valuable information they receive. Our take-home lessons for policy-makers are: you can
reach a lot of people cheaply via SMS; but do not think of it as a perfect substitute for other
forms of information dissemination. When using SMS communication, think twice about doing
it in a personalized manner, do not attempt to shame participants into sharing with others, and
do not spend energy trying to reward information sharing. Keep it simple.
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Figure 1. A square 
 
Figure 2. Redeeming and sharing behavior in the baseline intervention
 
Note: Redeeming the voucher means responding with a 'yes' SMS to our switchboard. Sending 
the voucher means responding with a 'yes' SMS to an SMS invitation to share information about 
the voucher with another randomly selected subject. The height of the bars represents the 
proportion of experimental subjects redeeming/sending mobile money vouchers. Confidence 









Round 1 I₁₁ I₁₂ I₁₃ I₁₄ 
Round 2 I₂₁ I₂₂ I₂₃ I₂₄ 
Round 3 I₃₁ I₃₂ I₃₃ I₃₄ 
Round 4 I₄₁ I₄₂ I₄₃ I₄₄ 
 




 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Square 1 G0-A G1-A G2-A G3-A 
Square 2 G0-I G1-I G2-I G3-I 
Square 3 G0-A G3-A G1-A G2-A 
Square 4 G0-I G3-I G1-I G2-I 
Square 5 G0-A G2-A G3-A G1-A 
Square 6 G0-I G2-I G3-I G1-I 
Square 7 G0-A G4-A G5-A G6-A 
Square 8 G0-I G4-I G5-I G6-I 
Square 9 G0-A G6-A G4-A G5-A 
Square 10 G0-I G6-I G4-I G5-I 
Square 11 G0-A G5-A G6-A G4-A 




Table 1: Sample characteristics and balance
Female
Age                            
in years




Income in '000 
Meticais/month
Sample characteristics:
Sample mean 0.589 39.963 6.175 0.042 3.445
Sample standard error (0.036) (1.003) (0.235) (0.015) (0.420)
Balance across squares:
Proportion of pairwise comparisons between squares 
that are significant at the 10% level 2/66 2/66 7/66 8/66 0/66
Joint F-test of balance across all squares p-value 0.762 0.818 0.195 0.126 0.934
Joint F-test of balance across the non-anonymous and 
anonymous treatments p-value 0.189 0.358 0.126 0.481 0.963
Joint F-test that games 1-2-3 = games 4-5-6 p-value 0.662 0.632 0.813 0.481 0.417
Note: Pairwise comparison tests are obtained by regressing the variable of interest on a square dummy, using only two squares at a time, and counting how many times the dummy 
is significant. There are 66 (i.e., N(N-1)/2) possible pairs of 12 squares. Using a 10 percent significance level, there should on average be 10 percent significant dummies (i.e., 6.6) if 
the null of perfect balance across all squares is true. Balance across all squares is tested by regressing the characteristic of interest on square dummies and performing a joint F-test of 
all dummies. Balance between games 1-2-3 and games 4-5-6 is tested by regressing the characteristic of interest on a games 4-5-6 dummy. Balance across the anonymous and non-
anonymous treatment is tested by regressing the characteristic of interest on the non-anonymous dummy. P-values from these tests are reported in the Table. Standard errors 
displayed in parentheses.
 
Table 2: Choices made by subjects in treatments T0/1/2/3     
    Baseline intervention              Treatment 1: variable cost of sending 
Treatment 2: 
shaming and fixed 
cost of sending 
Treatment 3: 
erroneous message 
and fixed cost of 
sending 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Redeeming the voucher:     
 All subjects 0.259 0.133 0.158 0.188 
 
 (0.037) (0.051) (0.060) (0.070) 
 Round 1 only (1) 0.271 0.125 0.125 0.167 
 
 (0.065) (0.069) (0.069) (0.078) 
 Rounds 2-4 (2) 0.253 0.143 0.214 0.250 
  (0.045) (0.078) (0.114) (0.164) 
 Non-anonymous 0.217 0.107 0.125 0.143 
  (0.043) (0.060) (0.069) (0.067) 
 Anonymous 0.333 0.176 0.214 0.500 
  (0.067) (0.095) (0.114) (0.289) 
Number of observations 143 45 38 32 
Sending the voucher:     
 All subjects 0.242 0.143 0.101 0.063 
 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.026) (0.021) 
 Non-anonymous 0.217 0.070 0.000 0.063 
  (0.029) (0.034) (0.000) (0.030) 
 Anonymous 0.268 0.189 0.147 0.063 
  (0.032) (0.041) (0.037) (0.030) 
Number of observations 392 147 139 128 
Note: Redeeming the voucher means responding with a 'yes' SMS to our switchboard. Sending the voucher means responding 
with a 'yes' SMS to an SMS invitation to share information about the voucher with another randomly selected subject. In game 
3, the zero value includes both alternatives to sending. Only two subjects sent the erroneous voucher. (1) In round 1 the 
voucher SMS is sent by the experimenter. (2) In rounds 2-4 the voucher SMS is sent at the request of a subject. Standard errors 
displayed in parentheses. 
 
Table 3: The decision to redeem the voucher in treatments T0/1/2/3
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment dummies (T0 is omitted category):
Treatment 1 dummy (variable cost) -0.182*** -0.304*** -0.134
(0.063) (0.079) (0.156)
Treatment 2 dummy (shaming and fixed cost of sending) -0.181*** -0.302*** -0.119
(0.066) (0.071) (0.190)
Treatment 3 dummy (erroneous message and fixed cost of sending) -0.116 -0.213** 0.023
(0.088) (0.096) (0.226)
Non-anonymous variant dummy -0.208** -0.196** -0.369
(0.089) (0.081) (0.231)
Dummy=1 if subject redeemed a voucher in a previous session 0.346***
(0.107)
Pairwise differences in individual characteristics times non-anonymous variant dummy:
Same gender 0.179
(0.139)
Same post-secondary education dummy 0.082
(0.145)
Absolute difference in age 0.004
(0.008)
Absolute difference in income (in '000 Meticais/month) -0.009
(0.012)
Round dummies yes yes yes
Session dummies yes yes yes
Individual characteristics: no yes yes
Pairwise differences in individual characteristics (uninteracted): no no yes





Test that T1 (β1 ) = T2 (β2 ) p-value 0.988 0.982 0.904
Test that T1 (β1 ) = T3 (β3 ) p-value 0.402 0.268 0.246
Test that T2 (β2 ) = T3 (β3 ) p-value 0.271 0.131 0.439
Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations
Note: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable is a binary variable defined as 1 if, when given the chance, the subject 
sends an SMS accepting the voucher. In column 3 we only include observations from rounds 2-3-4 since, in round 1, all SMS 
originate from the experimenters and thus differences in individual characteristics are not defined; we also include as controls 
the pairwise differences in individual characteristics uninteracted with the non-anonymous dummy. Individual characteristics 
include a female dummy, age, a post-secondary education dummy, and income in Meticais/month. Clustered standard errors, 
at the level of the individual, reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 
Table 4: The decision to send the voucher in treatments T0/1/2/3
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment dummies (T0 is omitted category):
Treatment 1 dummy (variable cost) -0.118* -0.089* -0.195**
(0.062) (0.049) (0.081)
Treatment 2 dummy (shaming and fixed cost of sending) -0.174** -0.135** -0.189***
(0.067) (0.059) (0.072)
Treatment 3 dummy (erroneous message and fixed cost of sending) -0.195*** -0.187*** -0.262***
(0.070) (0.059) (0.088)
Non-anonymous variant dummy -0.075 0.023 -0.116
(0.062) (0.039) (0.083)
Additional cost of sending the voucher -0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Dummy=1 if subject redeemed a voucher in the current session 0.466***
(0.064)
Dummy=1 if subject redeemed a voucher in a previous session 0.141***
(0.053)
Pairwise differences in individual characteristics times non-anonymous variant dummy:
Same gender 0.044
(0.038)
Same post-secondary education dummy 0.052
(0.059)
Absolute difference in age -0.000
(0.002)
Absolute difference in income (in '000 Meticais/month) -0.002
(0.006)
Round dummies yes yes yes
Session dummies yes yes yes
Individual characteristics no yes yes
Pairwise differences in individual characteristics (uninteracted): no no yes





Test that T1 (β1 ) = T2 (β2 ) p-value 0.092 0.299 0.915
Test that T1 (β1 ) = T3 (β3 ) p-value 0.020 0.054 0.038
Test that T2 (β2 ) = T3 (β3 ) p-value 0.599 0.165 0.192
R-squared
Number of observations
Note: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable is a binary variable defined as 1 if, when given the chance, the subject 
sends an SMS giving the voucher to another subject. In game 3, sending the false message (only 2 observations) is assimilated 
to not sending the voucher. The additional cost of sending the voucher is 0 in game 0, 5 Meticais in games 2 and 3, and 
varying between 0/5/10/15 Meticais in game 1. There is no sending in round 4. In column 3, we also include as controls the 
pairwise differences in individual characteristics uninteracted with the non-anonymous dummy. Individual characteristics include 
a female dummy, age, a post-secondary education dummy, and income in Meticais/month. Clustered standard errors, at the 
level of the individual, reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 
Table 5: Choices made by subjects in games 0/4/5/6
Baseline 
intervention
Treatment 4:                  
dictator game
Treatment 5:                                   
ultimatum game
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sending the voucher: Sender sent Sender sent Sender sent Sender sent Receiver sent back
All subjects 0.242 0.148 0.179 0.242 0.118
(0.022) (0.033) (0.036) (0.029) (0.046)
Non-anonymous variant 0.217 0.109 0.159 0.194 0.095
(0.029) (0.042) (0.044) (0.038) (0.066)
Anonymous treatment 0.268 0.183 0.208 0.288 0.133
(0.032) (0.050) (0.059) (0.043) (0.063)
Share sent 0.039 0.043 0.116
Share sent conditional on sending 0.265 0.239 0.986
Number of observations 392 115 117 219 51
Redeeming/accepting the voucher: Receiver redeemed Receiver accepted Sender redeemed
All subjects 0.259 0.571 0.375
(0.037) (0.202) (0.101)
Round 1 only (1) 0.271 n.a. 0.375
(0.065) n.a. (0.101)
Rounds 2-4 (2) 0.253 0.571 n.a.
(0.045) (0.202) n.a.
Number of observations 143 7 24
Treatment 6:                                                        
reverse dictator
Note: In treatment T4, senders can send up to 35 Meticais to receivers. 'Sender sent' is the proportion of senders sending positive amounts. The 'share sent' is the 
average amount sent divided by 35, the value of the voucher. Receiving is automatic in this game. Treatment T5 is analogous, except that receivers decide whether to 
accept offers sent by senders. 'Receiver accepted' is the proportion of accepted take-it-or-leave-it offers. In treatment T6, senders in round 1 have the choice of redeeming 
the voucher sent by the experimenter by responding with a 'yes' SMS to our switchboard. 'Sender redeemed' shows the proportion of senders doing so. In this treatment 
senders can send vouchers to receivers like in the baseline intervention: 'sender sent' is the proportion of vouchers sent. Receiving after round 1 is automatic. Receivers 
can then send back to senders up to the full amount of the voucher received (35 Meticais). 'Receiver sent back' is the proportion of receivers sending back positive 
amounts. The 'share sent' is the average amount sent back divided by 35, the value of the voucher. (1) In round 1 the voucher SMS is sent at the initiative of the 
experimenter. (2) In rounds 2-4 the voucher SMS is sent at the request of another subject. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
 
Table 6: The decision to send airtime in treatments T4/5/6
(1) (2)
Treatment dummies (T4 is omitted category):
Treatment 5 dummy (ultimatum) 0.053 0.048
(0.039) (0.045)
Treatment 6 dummy (reverse dictator -- sender) 0.149** 0.161***
(0.056) (0.060)
Treatment 6 dummy (reverse dictator -- receiver) 0.066 0.073
(0.067) (0.066)
Non-anonymous variant dummy -0.063 0.009
(0.082) (0.130)
Pairwise differences in individual characteristics times non-anonymous variant dummy:
Same gender dummy 0.109
(0.078)
Absolute difference in age 0.001
(0.004)
Absolute difference in income (in '000 Meticais/month) -0.013
(0.013)
Round dummies yes yes
Session dummies yes yes
Individual characteristics: no yes






Test that T5 (β5 ) = T6 -- sender (β6 ) p-value 0.114 0.086
Test that T5 (β5 ) = T6 -- receiver (β6b ) p-value 0.846 0.734
Test that T6 sender (β6 ) = T6 receiver (β6b ) p-value 0.104 0.083
R-squared
Number of observations
Note: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable is a binary variable defined as 1 if, when given the chance, 
the subject sends an SMS sharing the voucher with another subject. In column 2 we also include as controls the 
pairwise differences in individual characteristics uninteracted with the non-anonymous dummy. The absolute 
difference in education level is omitted due to multicollinearity. Individual characteristics include a female 
dummy, age, a post-secondary education dummy, and income in Meticais/month.  Clustered standard errors, at 
the level of the individual, reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.
 
Table 7: Amount sent in treatments T4/5/6, conditional on sending
(1)
Treatment variables (T4 is omitted category):
Treatment 5 dummy (ultimatum) -0.911
(4.448)







Test that game 5 (β5 ) = game 6 -- receiver (β6b ) p-value 0.000
R-squared
Number of observations
Note: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable is the amount sent to another 
subject in Meticais, conditional on an amount being sent. This decision is only relevant 
in T4 (sender), T5 (sender), and T6 (receiver). Due to the small number of observations, 
other regressors are not included. Clustered standard errors, at the level of the individual, 
reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.
 
Table 8: The decisions to redeem and send in treatments T0/1/2/3 -- omitting inactive subjects
Redeem Send
(1) (2)
Treatment dummies (T0 is omitted category):
Treatment 1 dummy (variable cost) -0.605*** -0.328**
(0.224) (0.138)
Treatment 2 dummy (shaming and fixed cost of sending) -0.586*** -0.447***
(0.178) (0.127)
Treatment 3 dummy (erroneous message and fixed cost of sending) -0.384 -0.525***
(0.256) (0.121)
Non-anonymous variant dummy -0.383** 0.043
(0.155) (0.084)
Additional cost of sending the voucher 0.003
(0.008)
Dummy=1 if subject redeemed a voucher in the current session 0.331***
(0.076)
Dummy=1 if subject redeemed a voucher in a previous session 0.268* 0.310***
(0.157) (0.078)
Round dummies: yes yes
Session dummies: yes yes






Test that T1 (β1 ) = T2 (β2 ) p-value 0.893 0.190
Test that T1 (β1 ) = T3 (β3 ) p-value 0.231 0.049
Test that T2 (β2 ) = T3 (β3 ) p-value 0.129 0.370
R-squared
Number of observations
Note: All regressions are OLS. In redeem the voucher, the dependent variable is a binary variable defined as 1 if, when 
given the chance, the subject sends an SMS accepting the voucher. In send the voucher, the dependent variable is a binary 
variable defined as 1 if, when given the chance, the subject sends an SMS giving the voucher to another subject. In 
treatment T3, sending the false message (only 2 observations) is assimilated to not sending the voucher. The additional 
cost of sending the voucher is 0 in T0, 5 Meticais in T2 and T3, and varying between 0/5/10/15 Meticais in T1. 
Individual characteristics include gender, age, a post-secondary education dummy, and monthly income. Clustered 
standard errors, at the level of the individual, reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.
 
Table 9: The decision to send airtime in treatments T4/5/6 -- omitting inactive subjects
send any 
amount
Treatment dummies (T4 is omitted category):
Treatment 5 dummy (ultimatum) 0.073
(0.068)
Treatment 6 dummy (reverse dictator -- sender) 0.346***
(0.091)
Treatment 6 dummy (reverse dictator -- receiver) 0.262*
(0.138)










Test that T5 (β5 ) = T6 -- sender (β6 ) p-value 0.008
Test that T5 (β5 ) = T6 -- receiver (β6b ) p-value 0.202
Test that T6 sender (β6 ) = T6 receiver (β6b ) p-value 0.505
R-squared
Number of observations
Note: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable is a binary variable defined as 1 if, when given the 
chance, the subject sends an SMS sharing the voucher with another subject. Individual characteristics include 
gender, age, a post-secondary education dummy, and monthly income. Clustered standard errors, at the level 
of the individual, reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 
 




Msg d project mKesh NOVAFRICA. Enviaremos sms em 
breve. Respond pra ganhar bonus mKesh. Respond a cada 
numero que lhe enviar SMS. Duvidas ligue ou SMS-
821783387
NOVAFRICA. Nossas SMS NAO SAO ENVIADAS por 
823131. SAO ENVIADAS por varios NUMEROS 
NORMAIS. Respond a cada numero. So custa SMS ou 2 
meticais quando nao tem SMS
Senhor(a) fez parte do estudo mKesh. Daremos 
oportunidade de ganhar dinheiro em mKesh. No fim tera 




Message from project mKesh NOVAFRICA. We will soon 
send SMS. Answer to earn bonus mKesh. Answer to each 
number sending SMS. Any doubts call or send SMS to 
821783387.
NOVAFRICA. Our SMS ARE NOT SENT through 
823131. They ARE SENT through several REGULAR 
NUMBERS. Answer to each of those numbers. It only 
costs SMS or 2 Meticais when you do not have SMS.
You took part in the mKesh study. We will give you the 
opportunity to earn money in mKesh. In the end you will 
have a bonus of 70 Meticais for participating. Responding 












Pode ganhar 35Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para isso deve 
responder a esta mensagem com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h




Pode ganhar 35Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para isso deve 
responder a esta mensagem com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h
Quer dar a ganhar 35Mts a pessoa [1-4]? S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de 
[e.g., 661-1320]Mts/mes. Responda SIM se quiser.
English 
translation
You can earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. For that 
purpose, you need to respond to this message with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
You can give the opportunity to 4 other people of winning 
35 Meticais each. For that purpose, you need to respond to 
each one of the following messages with the word YES in 
the next 24 hours.
Do you want to give person [1-4] the opportunity to earn 
35 Meticais? His/her name is [first name of recipient in 
capital letters]. He/she is [age] years old, has [level of 
education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in 
income. Respond YES if you want. [These are 4 messages, 




Ate quatro pessoas deram-t possibilidade d ganhar 35Mts 
na sua conta mKesh. Pra aceitar deve responder cada 
mensagem seguinte com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa [1-4]? Responda SIM se 
quiser.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h




Ate quatro pessoas deram-t possibilidade d ganhar 35Mts 
na sua conta mKesh. Pra aceitar deve responder cada 
mensagem seguinte com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa 3? S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. 
tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-
1320]Mts/mes. Responda SIM se quiser.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h
Quer dar a ganhar 35Mts a pessoa 1? S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-
1320]Mts/mes. Responda SIM se quiser.
English 
translation
Up to four different people gave you the opportunity to 
earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. To accept you 
need to respond to each of the following messages with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
Do you want to receive 35 Meticais from person [1-4]? 
His/her name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. 
He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has 
[income band in Meticais]/month in income. Respond 
YES if you want. [These are up to 4 messages, one for 
each person.]
You can give the opportunity to 4 other people of winning 
35 Meticais each. For that purpose, you need to respond to 
each one of the following messages with the word YES in 
the next 24 hours.
Do you want to give person [1-4] the opportunity to earn 
35 Meticais? His/her name is [first name of recipient in 
capital letters]. He/she is [age] years old, has [level of 
education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in 
income. Respond YES if you want. [These are 4 messages, 
one for each person.]
Anonymous Original 
Portuguese
Ate quatro pessoas deram-t possibilidade d ganhar 35Mts 
na sua conta mKesh. Pra aceitar deve responder cada 
mensagem seguinte com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h




Ate quatro pessoas deram-t possibilidade d ganhar 35Mts 
na sua conta mKesh. Pra aceitar deve responder cada 
mensagem seguinte com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa 3? S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. 
tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-
1320]Mts/mes. Responda SIM se quiser.
English 
translation
Up to four different people gave you the opportunity to 
earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. To accept you 
need to respond to each of the following messages with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
Do you want to receive 35 Meticais from person [1-4]? 
His/her name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. 
He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has 
[income band in Meticais]/month in income. Respond 











days 2 and 3
 




Pode ganhar 35Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para isso deve 
responder a esta mensagem com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h. 
Pode tambem ter de pagar uma comissao.
Quer dar a ganhar 35 Mts a pessoa [1-4]? Se quiser 




Pode ganhar 35Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para isso deve 
responder a esta mensagem com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h. 
Pode tambem ter de pagar uma comissao.
Quer dar a ganhar 35 Mts a pessoa [1-4]? S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de 
[e.g., 661-1320]Mts/mes. Se quiser responda SIM. O custo 
sera [0/5/10/15]Mts em conta mKesh.
English 
translation
You can earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. For that 
purpose, you need to respond to this message with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
You can give the opportunity to 4 other people of winning 
35 Meticais each. For that purpose, you need to respond to 
each one of the following messages with the word YES in 
the next 24 hours. You may also have to pay a fee.
Do you want to give person [1-4] the opportunity to earn 
35 Meticais? His/her name is [first name of recipient in 
capital letters]. He/she is [age] years old, has [level of 
education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in 
income. Respond YES if you want. The cost will be 
[0/5/10/15] Meticais in the mKesh account. [These are 4 




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe a possibilidade de ganhar 
35 Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para aceitar deve responder a 
cada uma das seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa [1-4]? Responda SIM se 
quiser.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h. 
Pode tambem ter de pagar uma comissao.
Quer dar a ganhar 35 Mts a pessoa [1-4]? Se quiser 




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe a possibilidade de ganhar 
35 Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para aceitar deve responder a 
cada uma das seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa 3? S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. 
tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-
1320]Mts/mes. Responda SIM se quiser.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h. 
Pode tambem ter de pagar uma comissao.
Quer dar a ganhar 35 Mts a pessoa [1-4]? S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de 
[e.g., 661-1320]Mts/mes. Se quiser responda SIM. O custo 
sera [0/5/10/15]Mts em conta mKesh.
English 
translation
Up to four different people gave you the opportunity to 
earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. To accept you 
need to respond to each of the following messages with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
Do you want to receive 35 Meticais from person [1-4]? 
His/her name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. 
He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has 
[income band in Meticais]/month in income. Respond 
YES if you want. [These are up to 4 messages, one for 
each person.]
You can give the opportunity to 4 other people of winning 
35 Meticais each. For that purpose, you need to respond to 
each one of the following messages with the word YES in 
the next 24 hours. You may also have to pay a fee.
Do you want to give person [1-4] the opportunity to earn 
35 Meticais? His/her name is [first name of recipient in 
capital letters]. He/she is [age] years old, has [level of 
education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in 
income. Respond YES if you want. The cost will be 
[0/5/10/15] Meticais in the mKesh account. [These are 4 




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe a possibilidade de ganhar 
35 Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para aceitar deve responder a 
cada uma das seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe a possibilidade de ganhar 
35 Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para aceitar deve responder a 
cada uma das seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa 3? S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. 
tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-
1320]Mts/mes. Responda SIM se quiser.
English 
translation
Up to four different people gave you the opportunity to 
earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. To accept you 
need to respond to each of the following messages with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
Do you want to receive 35 Meticais from person [1-4]? 
His/her name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. 
He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has 
[income band in Meticais]/month in income. Respond 











days 2 and 3
 




Pode ganhar 35Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para isso deve 
responder a esta mensagem com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h. 
Pode tambem ter de pagar uma comissao.
Quer dar a ganhar 35Mts a pessoa [1-4]? Se quiser resp/a 
SIM. O custo sera 5Mts em mKesh. Em alternativa 
enviaremos um codigo errado a pessoa.
Original 
Portuguese
Pode ganhar 35Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para isso deve 
responder a esta mensagem com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h. 
Pode tambem ter de pagar uma comissao.
Quer dar a ganhar 35 Mts a pessoa [1-4]? S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de 
[e.g., 661-1320]Mts/mes. Se quiser resp/a SIM. O custo 
sera 5Mts em mKesh. Em alternativa enviaremos um 
codigo errado a pessoa.
English 
translation
You can earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. For that 
purpose, you need to respond to this message with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
You can give the opportunity to 4 other people of winning 
35 Meticais each. For that purpose, you need to respond to 
each one of the following messages with the word YES in 
the next 24 hours. You may also have to pay a fee.
Do you want to give person [1-4] the opportunity to earn 
35 Meticais? His/her name is [first name of recipient in 
capital letters]. He/she is [age] years old, has [level of 
education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in 
income. Respond YES if you want. The cost will be 5 




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe a possibilidade de ganhar 
35 Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para aceitar deve responder a 
cada uma das seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa [1-4]? Responda SIM se 
quiser. [OR] A pessoa [1-4] enviou-lhe um codigo errado. 
o que nao lhe deixa ganhar 35 Mts.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h. 
Pode tambem ter de pagar uma comissao.
Quer dar a ganhar 35Mts a pessoa [1-4]? Se quiser resp/a 
SIM. O custo sera 5Mts em mKesh. Em alternativa 
enviaremos um codigo errado a pessoa.
Original 
Portuguese
Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe a possibilidade de ganhar 
35 Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para aceitar deve responder a 
cada uma das seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa 3? S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. 
tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-
1320]Mts/mes. Responda SIM se quiser. [OR] A pessoa [1-
4] enviou-lhe um codigo errado. o que nao lhe deixa ganhar 
35 Mts. S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e 
tem rend/os de [661-1320]Mts/mes.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h. 
Pode tambem ter de pagar uma comissao.
Quer dar a ganhar 35 Mts a pessoa [1-4]? S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de 
[e.g., 661-1320]Mts/mes. Se quiser resp/a SIM. O custo 
sera 5Mts em mKesh. Em alternativa enviaremos um 
codigo errado a pessoa.
English 
translation
Up to four different people gave you the opportunity to 
earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. To accept you 
need to respond to each of the following messages with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
Do you want to receive 35 Meticais from person [1-4]? 
His/her name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. 
He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has 
[income band in Meticais]/month in income. Respond 
YES if you want. [OR] Person [1-4] sent you a wrong 
code, which does not let you win 35 Meticais. His/her 
name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. He/she is 
[age] years old, has [level of education], and has [income 
band in Meticais]/month in income.
You can give the opportunity to 4 other people of winning 
35 Meticais each. For that purpose, you need to respond to 
each one of the following messages with the word YES in 
the next 24 hours. You may also have to pay a fee.
Do you want to give person [1-4] the opportunity to earn 
35 Meticais? His/her name is [first name of recipient in 
capital letters]. He/she is [age] years old, has [level of 
education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in 
income. Respond YES if you want. The cost will be 5 




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe a possibilidade de ganhar 
35 Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para aceitar deve responder a 
cada uma das seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa [1-4]? Responda SIM se 
quiser. [OR] A pessoa [1-4] enviou-lhe um codigo errado. 
o que nao lhe deixa ganhar 35 Mts.
Original 
Portuguese
Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe a possibilidade de ganhar 
35 Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para aceitar deve responder a 
cada uma das seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa 3? S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. 
tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-
1320]Mts/mes. Responda SIM se quiser. [OR] A pessoa [1-
4] enviou-lhe um codigo errado. o que nao lhe deixa ganhar 
35 Mts. S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e 
tem rend/os de [661-1320]Mts/mes.
English 
translation
Up to four different people gave you the opportunity to 
earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. To accept you 
need to respond to each of the following messages with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
Do you want to receive 35 Meticais from person [1-4]? 
His/her name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. 
He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has 
[income band in Meticais]/month in income. Respond 
YES if you want. [OR] Person [1-4] sent you a wrong 
code, which does not let you win 35 Meticais. His/her 
name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. He/she is 
[age] years old, has [level of education], and has [income 
















Pode ganhar 35Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para isso deve 
responder a esta mensagem com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h. 
Pode tambem ter de pagar uma comissao.
Quer dar a ganhar 35Mts a pessoa [1-4]? Se quiser resp/a 
SIM. O custo sera 5Mts em mKesh. 2 altern/as: enviarmos 
codigo errado -resp/a NAO. enviarmos nada -nao resp/a.
Original 
Portuguese
Pode ganhar 35Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para isso deve 
responder a esta mensagem com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h. 
Pode tambem ter de pagar uma comissao.
Quer dar a ganhar 35 Mts a pessoa [1-4]? S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de 
[e.g., 661-1320]Mts/mes. Se quiser resp/a SIM. O custo 
sera 5Mts em mKesh. 2 altern/as: enviarmos codigo errado -
resp/a NAO. enviarmos nada -nao resp/a.
English 
translation
You can earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. For that 
purpose, you need to respond to this message with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
You can give the opportunity to 4 other people of winning 
35 Meticais each. For that purpose, you need to respond to 
each one of the following messages with the word YES in 
the next 24 hours. You may also have to pay a fee.
Do you want to give person [1-4] the opportunity to earn 
35 Meticais? His/her name is [first name of recipient in 
capital letters]. He/she is [age] years old, has [level of 
education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in 
income. Respond YES if you want. The cost will be 5 
Meticais in the mKesh account. 2 alternatives: we send a 
wrong code - respond NO; we do not send anything - do 
not respond. [These are 4 messages, one for each person.]
Anonymous Original 
Portuguese
Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe a possibilidade de ganhar 
35 Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para aceitar deve responder a 
cada uma das seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa [1-4]? Responda SIM se 
quiser. [OR] A pessoa [1-4] enviou-lhe um codigo errado. 
o que nao lhe deixa ganhar 35 Mts.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h. 
Pode tambem ter de pagar uma comissao.
Quer dar a ganhar 35Mts a pessoa [1-4]? Se quiser resp/a 
SIM. O custo sera 5Mts em mKesh. 2 altern/as: enviarmos 
codigo errado -resp/a NAO. enviarmos nada -nao resp/a.
Original 
Portuguese
Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe a possibilidade de ganhar 
35 Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para aceitar deve responder a 
cada uma das seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa 3? S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. 
tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-
1320]Mts/mes. Responda SIM se quiser. [OR] A pessoa [1-
4] enviou-lhe um codigo errado. o que nao lhe deixa ganhar 
35 Mts. S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e 
tem rend/os de [661-1320]Mts/mes.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h. 
Pode tambem ter de pagar uma comissao.
Quer dar a ganhar 35 Mts a pessoa [1-4]? S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de 
[e.g., 661-1320]Mts/mes. Se quiser resp/a SIM. O custo 
sera 5Mts em mKesh. 2 altern/as: enviarmos codigo errado -
resp/a NAO. enviarmos nada -nao resp/a.
English 
translation
Up to four different people gave you the opportunity to 
earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. To accept you 
need to respond to each of the following messages with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
Do you want to receive 35 Meticais from person [1-4]? 
His/her name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. 
He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has 
[income band in Meticais]/month in income. Respond 
YES if you want. [OR] Person [1-4] sent you a wrong 
code, which does not let you win 35 Meticais. His/her 
name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. He/she is 
[age] years old, has [level of education], and has [income 
band in Meticais]/month in income. [These are up to 4 
messages, one for each person.]
You can give the opportunity to 4 other people of winning 
35 Meticais each. For that purpose, you need to respond to 
each one of the following messages with the word YES in 
the next 24 hours. You may also have to pay a fee.
Do you want to give person [1-4] the opportunity to earn 
35 Meticais? His/her name is [first name of recipient in 
capital letters]. He/she is [age] years old, has [level of 
education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in 
income. Respond YES if you want. The cost will be 5 
Meticais in the mKesh account. 2 alternatives: we send a 
wrong code - respond NO; we do not send anything - do 
not respond. [These are 4 messages, one for each person.]
Anonymous Original 
Portuguese
Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe a possibilidade de ganhar 
35 Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para aceitar deve responder a 
cada uma das seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa [1-4]? Responda SIM se 
quiser. [OR] A pessoa [1-4] enviou-lhe um codigo errado. 
o que nao lhe deixa ganhar 35 Mts.
Original 
Portuguese
Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe a possibilidade de ganhar 
35 Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para aceitar deve responder a 
cada uma das seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Quer receber 35Mts da pessoa 3? S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. 
tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-
1320]Mts/mes. Responda SIM se quiser. [OR] A pessoa [1-
4] enviou-lhe um codigo errado. o que nao lhe deixa ganhar 
35 Mts. S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e 
tem rend/os de [661-1320]Mts/mes.
English 
translation
Up to four different people gave you the opportunity to 
earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. To accept you 
need to respond to each of the following messages with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
Do you want to receive 35 Meticais from person [1-4]? 
His/her name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. 
He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has 
[income band in Meticais]/month in income. Respond 
YES if you want. [OR] Person [1-4] sent you a wrong 
code, which does not let you win 35 Meticais. His/her 
name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. He/she is 
[age] years old, has [level of education], and has [income 
band in Meticais]/month in income. [These are up to 4 













Table A6: Messages in treatment T4 




Ganhou 35Mts em mKesh. Deste valor pode dar ate 35Mts a pessoa [1-4]. Resp/a valor que quer dar p/este n/o em 
24h. A dif/a p/os 35 caira na s/ conta mKesh.
Original 
Portuguese
Ganhou 35Mts em mKesh. Deste valor pode dar ate 35Mts a pessoa 1. S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 
8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [e.g., 661-1320]Mts/mes. Resp/a valor que quer dar p/este n/o em 24h. A dif/a p/os 35 caira 
na s/ conta mKesh.
English 
translation
You have earned 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. From this value you can give up to 35 Meticais to person [1-4]. 
He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in income. Respond with 
the value you want to give to this phone number in the next 24 hours. The difference to the 35 Meticais will be in 




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe algum dinheiro para a sua 
conta mKesh. Recebeu [up to 35]Mts da pessoa [1-4].
Ganhou 35Mts em mKesh. Deste valor pode dar ate 35Mts a pessoa [1-4]. Resp/a valor que quer dar p/este n/o em 
24h. A dif/a p/os 35 caira na s/ conta mKesh.
Original 
Portuguese
Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe algum dinheiro para a sua 
conta mKesh.
Recebeu [up to 35]Mts da pessoa [1-4]. S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-
1320]Mts/mes.
Ganhou 35Mts em mKesh. Deste valor pode dar ate 35Mts a pessoa 1. S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 
8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [e.g., 661-1320]Mts/mes. Resp/a valor que quer dar p/este n/o em 24h. A dif/a p/os 35 caira 
na s/ conta mKesh.
English 
translation
Up to four different people sent you some money to your 
mKesh account.
You have received [up to 35] Meticais from person [1-4]. 
His/her name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. 
He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has 
[income band in Meticais]/month in income. [These are up 
to 4 messages, one for each person.]
You have earned 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. From this value you can give up to 35 Meticais to person [1-4]. 
He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in income. Respond with 
the value you want to give to this phone number in the next 24 hours. The difference to the 35 Meticais will be in 
your mKesh account. [These are 4 messages, one for each person.]
Anonymous Original 
Portuguese
Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe algum dinheiro para a sua 
conta mKesh.
Recebeu [up to 35]Mts da pessoa [1-4].
Original 
Portuguese
Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe algum dinheiro para a sua 
conta mKesh.
Recebeu [up to 35]Mts da pessoa [1-4]. S/nome e [e.g., 




Up to four different people sent you some money to your 
mKesh account.
You have received [up to 35] Meticais from person [1-4]. 
His/her name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. 
He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has 
[income band in Meticais]/month in income. [These are up 













Table A7: Messages in treatment T5




Pode ganhar com outra pessoa 35Mts em mKesh. Proponha q/tos Mts de 35 devem ir p/pessoa 1: se ela aceitar. ambos 
recebem prop/a. senao nada. Resp/a n/o de 0-35 em 24h.
Original 
Portuguese
Pode ganhar com outra pessoa 35Mts em mKesh. Proponha q/tos Mts de 35 devem ir p/pessoa 1: se ela aceitar. ambos 
recebem prop/a. senao nada. S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [e.g., 661-
1320]Mts/mes. Resp/a n/o de 0-35 em 24h.
English 
translation
You can earn 35 Meticais in mKesh together with another person. Propose how many Meticais out of 35 should de 
given to person [1-4]: if he/she accepts, you both earn the amounts you propose; if he/she does not accept, nobody 
earns any money. He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in 




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe propostas de divisao de 
35Mts em conta mKesh. Para cada proposta/pessoa: se 
aceitar. ambos recebem os valores da proposta. se nao 
aceitar. ninguem recebe nada.
A pessoa [1-4] propoe dar-lhe [up to 35]Mts e ficar com o 
resto (de 35Mts). Se quiser aceitar esta proposta responda 
SIM.
Pode ganhar com outra pessoa 35Mts em mKesh. Proponha q/tos Mts de 35 devem ir p/pessoa 1: se ela aceitar. ambos 
recebem prop/a. senao nada. Resp/a n/o de 0-35 em 24h.
Original 
Portuguese
Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe propostas de divisao de 
35Mts em conta mKesh. Para cada proposta/pessoa: se 
aceitar. ambos recebem os valores da proposta. se nao 
aceitar. ninguem recebe nada.
A pessoa [1-4] propoe dar-lhe [up to 35]Mts e ficar com o 
resto (de 35Mts). S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a 
[8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-1320]Mts/mes. Se quiser 
aceitar esta proposta responda SIM.
Pode ganhar com outra pessoa 35Mts em mKesh. Proponha q/tos Mts de 35 devem ir p/pessoa 1: se ela aceitar. ambos 
recebem prop/a. senao nada. S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [e.g., 661-
1320]Mts/mes. Resp/a n/o de 0-35 em 24h.
English 
translation
Up to four different people sent you proposals to divide 35 
Meticais in your mKesh account. For each proposal/person: 
if you accept, both you and that person receive the values 
in the proposal; if you do not accept, nobody earns any 
money.
Person [1-4] proposes to give you [up to 35] Meticais and 
keep the remainder (out of 35 Meticais). His/her name is 
[first name of recipient in capital letters]. He/she is [age] 
years old, has [level of education], and has [income band in 
Meticais]/month in income. If you want to accept this 
proposal, respond YES. [These are up to 4 messages, one 
for each person.]
You can earn 35 Meticais in mKesh together with another person. Propose how many Meticais out of 35 should de 
given to person [1-4]: if he/she accepts, you both earn the amounts you propose; if he/she does not accept, nobody 
earns any money. He/she is [age] years old, has [level of education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in 





Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe propostas de divisao de 
35Mts em conta mKesh. Para cada proposta/pessoa: se 
aceitar. ambos recebem os valores da proposta. se nao 
aceitar. ninguem recebe nada.
A pessoa [1-4] propoe dar-lhe [up to 35]Mts e ficar com o 




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe propostas de divisao de 
35Mts em conta mKesh. Para cada proposta/pessoa: se 
aceitar. ambos recebem os valores da proposta. se nao 
aceitar. ninguem recebe nada.
A pessoa [1-4] propoe dar-lhe [up to 35]Mts e ficar com o 
resto (de 35Mts). S/nome e [e.g., JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a 
[8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-1320]Mts/mes. Se quiser 
aceitar esta proposta responda SIM.
English 
translation
Up to four different people sent you proposals to divide 35 
Meticais in your mKesh account. For each proposal/person: 
if you accept, both you and that person receive the values 
in the proposal; if you do not accept, nobody earns any 
money.
Person [1-4] proposes to give you [up to 35] Meticais and 
keep the remainder (out of 35 Meticais). His/her name is 
[first name of recipient in capital letters]. He/she is [age] 
years old, has [level of education], and has [income band in 
Meticais]/month in income. If you want to accept this 

















Pode ganhar 35Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para isso deve 
responder a esta mensagem com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h




Pode ganhar 35Mts na sua conta mKesh. Para isso deve 
responder a esta mensagem com a palavra SIM nas 
proximas 24h.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h
Quer dar a ganhar 35 Mts a pessoa [1-4]? S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de 
[e.g., 661-1320]Mts/mes. Responda SIM se quiser.
English 
translation
You can earn 35 Meticais in your mKesh account. For that 
purpose, you need to respond to this message with the 
word YES in the next 24 hours.
You can give the opportunity to 4 other people of winning 
35 Meticais each. For that purpose, you need to respond to 
each one of the following messages with the word YES in 
the next 24 hours.
Do you want to give person [1-4] the opportunity to earn 
35 Meticais? His/her name is [first name of recipient in 
capital letters]. He/she is [age] years old, has [level of 
education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in 
income. Respond YES if you want. [These are 4 messages, 




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe 35 Mts (cada uma) para a 
sua conta mKesh. Pode recompensar cada uma delas de 
volta.
Recebeu 35Mts em mKesh da pessoa [1-4]. Deste valor 
pode dar de volta ate 35Mts. Resp/a valor que quer dar 
p/este n/o em 24h. A dif/a p/os 35 caira na s/ conta 
mKesh.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe 35 Mts (cada uma) para a 
sua conta mKesh. Pode recompensar cada uma delas de 
volta.
Recebeu 35Mts em mKesh da pessoa [1-4]. S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-
1320]Mts/mes. Deste valor pode dar de volta ate 35Mts. 
Resp/a valor que quer dar p/este n/o em 24h. A dif/a p/os 
35 caira na s/ conta mKesh.
Pode dar possibilidade de outras 4 pessoas ganhar 35Mts 
cada uma. Para isso deve responder a cada uma das 
seguintes mensagens com a palavra SIM nas proximas 24h
Quer dar a ganhar 35 Mts a pessoa [1-4]? S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [e.g., 8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de 
[e.g., 661-1320]Mts/mes. Responda SIM se quiser.
English 
translation
Up to four different people sent you 35 Meticais in your 
mKesh account. You can compensate each one of them 
back for that.
You have received 35 Meticais from person [1-4].  His/her 
name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. He/she is 
[age] years old, has [level of education], and has [income 
band in Meticais]/month in income. From this value you 
can give back up to 35 Meticais to person [1-4]. Respond 
with the value you want to give to this phone number in 
the next 24 hours. The difference to the 35 Meticais will be 
in your mKesh account. [These are up to 4 messages, one 
for each person.]
You can give the opportunity to 4 other people of winning 
35 Meticais each. For that purpose, you need to respond to 
each one of the following messages with the word YES in 
the next 24 hours.
Do you want to give person [1-4] the opportunity to earn 
35 Meticais? His/her name is [first name of recipient in 
capital letters]. He/she is [age] years old, has [level of 
education], and has [income band in Meticais]/month in 
income. Respond YES if you want. [These are 4 messages, 




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe 35 Mts (cada uma) para a 
sua conta mKesh. Pode recompensar cada uma delas de 
volta.
Recebeu 35Mts em mKesh da pessoa [1-4]. Deste valor 
pode dar de volta ate 35Mts. Resp/a valor que quer dar 




Ate quatro pessoas enviaram-lhe 35 Mts (cada uma) para a 
sua conta mKesh. Pode recompensar cada uma delas de 
volta.
Recebeu 35Mts em mKesh da pessoa [1-4]. S/nome e [e.g., 
JOSE]. tem [e.g., 30]. a [8a cl.]. e tem rend/os de [661-
1320]Mts/mes. Deste valor pode dar de volta ate 35Mts. 
Resp/a valor que quer dar p/este n/o em 24h. A dif/a p/os 
35 caira na s/ conta mKesh.
English 
translation
Up to four different people sent you 35 Meticais in your 
mKesh account. You can compensate each one of them 
back for that.
You have received 35 Meticais from person [1-4].  His/her 
name is [first name of recipient in capital letters]. He/she is 
[age] years old, has [level of education], and has [income 
band in Meticais]/month in income. From this value you 
can give back up to 35 Meticais to person [1-4]. Respond 
with the value you want to give to this phone number in 
the next 24 hours. The difference to the 35 Meticais will be 













Table B. Power calculations for all the main regression tests
Variable Control category Compared with n1 n2 delta
For Table 3
Redeeming T0 T1 143 45 -0.16
T0 T2 143 38 -0.17
T0 T3 143 32 -0.18
anonymous (T0) non-anonymous 71 71 -0.18
anonymous (T0/1/2/3) non-anonymous 134 134 -0.13
For Table 4
Sending T0 T1 392 147 -0.10
T0 T2 392 139 0.10
T0 T3 392 128 -0.10
anonymous (T0) non-anonymous 196 196 -0.10
anonymous (T0/1/2/3) non-anonymous 403 403 -0.07
For Table 6
Sending T4 T5 115 117 0.13
T4 T6 115 219 0.12
T4 T6b 115 51 0.17
anonymous (T4/5/6/6b) non-anonymous 251 251 0.10
For Table 7
Amount sent T4 T5 17 21 8.39
in Meticais T4 T6b 17 6 9.27
All calculations are based on actual sample sizes and are centered on average of the control category. n1 is the 
number of control observations; n2 is the number of observations in the comparison category. Parameters are: 
alpha=10% significance, power=80% probability to detect. For dichotomous variables (Tables 3, 4 and 6), the 
option 'twoproportions' is selected and no standard deviation is required. For Table 7 the option 'twomeans' is used 
since the dependent variable is a continuous variable. Since the amount sent can only take values between 0 and 35 
Meticais,  we set the standard deviation equal to that of a uniform distribution over the [0,35] interval, which 
corresponds to random play. It is a conservative (i.e., large) value since, conditional on sending, subjects are likely 
to send more than 0 Meticais, which is the default value if they don't send anything.
